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Abstract
This study is a case study of federal logistics support during Hurricane Katrina
disaster relief operations. Data from federal contracts covering the first ten weeks of
Katrina are used to measure federal logistics activity. The study investigates whether
chaos theory, part of complexity science, can extract information from Katrina
contracting data to help managers make better logistics decisions during disaster relief.
The study uses three analytical techniques: embedding, fitting the data to a logistic
equation, and plotting the limit-cycle. Embedding and fitting a logistic equation to the
data were used to test for deterministic chaos. The logistic equation and two versions of
the limit-cycle model developed by Priesmeyer, Baik and Cole were also tested as
potential management tools.
This study found deterministic chaos was present during the first week of disaster
relief, but inconclusive results for subsequent weeks possibly due to internal changes to
the relief dynamics. The research concludes that the initial conditions and early actions
will have a significant affect on disaster relief outcome. Furthermore, many events that
appear to be uncontrollable and random may actually be controllable. Therefore,
managers play a critical role in preparing for and providing guidance in the early stages
of disaster relief.
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THE CHAOS OF KATRINA:
A NONLINEAR ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL LOGISTICS SUPPORT DURING
HURRICANE KATRINA RELIEF OPERATIONS

I. Introduction
Background
On Thursday, August 25, 2005 a tropical storm in the Caribbean was upgraded to
hurricane status, which was not unusual since it was the heart of hurricane season. By
Friday of the week, the same hurricane, newly named Katrina, was predicted to become a
category four hurricane and a serious threat to the Gulf Coast from Alabama through
Louisiana. The same day, Friday, the governors of Louisiana and Mississippi declared a
state of Emergency for their respective states. On Saturday, people in Louisiana and
Mississippi began evacuations in anticipation of Katrina. On Sunday, President George
W. Bush declared Louisiana a federal disaster area. The Superdome was opened as a
place of refuge on the same day. On Monday, August 29, 2005 at 6:10 CDT Katrina
made landfall (Committee, 2006: Ch 5). This is only the beginning of the disaster that
has been called the worst natural disaster in modern American history - Hurricane
Katrina (Townsend, 2006:1).
Hurricane Katrina affected a huge area. Over 90,000 square miles were
devastated and much of the local infrastructure destroyed. Millions of people had their
lives thrown into disarray (Carafano, 2006). Furthermore, although the total number of
people who died as a result of Katrina may never be known for certain, it has been
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estimated to be over 1,300 (“Death,” 2006:1). The economic damage caused by Katrina
was huge as well. It has been estimated at $225 billion, which would make it America's
most expensive disaster (Wolk, 2005). Out of this estimate, the federal government has
already allocated over $108 billion to help rebuild the effected infrastructure and provide
financial aid to survivors (DHS, No Date). Especially hard hit was New Orleans. It had
escaped the initial wrath of Katrina only to be inundated with water as the dikes in New
Orleans’ levees broke. Although Katrina devastated the Louisiana and Mississippi gulf
coast, making the disaster worse to many survivors was the agonizingly slow relief
caused by poor government logistics performance. The US Senate report on the disaster,
“A Nation Still Unprepared,” did not mince words in its critique of the relief effort. The
report indicated there was a failure at all government levels to take the threat of possible
catastrophe as a result of the hurricane season seriously. Although Katrina had been
tracked for days prior to landfall, the government failed to take action, and failed
repeatedly after landfall to provide adequate relief. The report laid blame on federal,
state, and local governments for not doing more to help prepare for disaster and to
quickly respond in the aftermath of Katrina. Furthermore, the report claimed, “The
results were tragic loss of life and human suffering on a massive scale, and an
undermining of confidence in our government’s ability to plan, prepare for, and respond
to national catastrophes” (Committee, 2006: 2). This has significant ramifications.
First, Katrina was not the only catastrophic hurricane that was plagued by poor
local, state, and federal response; Hurricane Andrew was another (“Disaster
Management,” 1993). Poor federal disaster response to Andrew culminated in the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and Department of Defense (DoD)
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changing their disaster related plans and policies to prevent similar performance in future
disaster relief operations (Youngbluth, 1996: 1-6). Nevertheless, lessons learned from
Andrew were either not applied or were not enough to prevent a repeat of the poor
performance during Hurricane Katrina. In addition, the year prior to Katrina a joint
government exercise, Hurricane Pam, was conducted based on the scenario that a
category three hurricane makes landfall in New Orleans. The exercise identified the
possibility of the levees in New Orleans failing resulting in flooding the city. It also
foresaw significant deaths, the need to evacuate between 200,000 and 300,000 people and
other ominously similar details experienced during Katrina. Nevertheless, significant
lessons learned from the exercise were not applied prior to Katrina (Committee, 2006: Ch
8).
Second, many Americans considered the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001
to be a watershed event that was supposed to alert all Americans to the possibility of
other attacks or threats to our way of life. Katrina serves as a reminder that the United
States is not as prepared for catastrophe as many people would like to think it is.
Meteorologists know prior to landfall when a hurricane is approaching and their reports
allow people a few days to prepare. This is not the case with most other disasters.
Hurricane Katrina should not have caught the nation as unprepared as it was (Committee,
2006: note).
Finally, statistically Americans can expect to see more frequent severe storms in
the future. For years, meteorologists and other scientists have been studying the effects
of global warming. Whether it is a natural phenomenon or caused by human activities,
global warming is having an effect on weather patterns (Position,” 2005; “Global,”
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2006). For instance, a study found an 80 percent increase worldwide in Category four
and five hurricanes, the most severe type. Also, in the past thirty-five years there has
been an increase in the total number of hurricanes in the North Atlantic (Webster and
others, 2005:1844-1846; Kerr, 2005: 1807). Hurricane Katrina was one such storm.
Disasters, especially those as catastrophic as Katrina destroy more than homes
and infrastructure, they destroy lives. Many people are killed, more are physically
injured either directly from the disaster or because they are unable to get help for preexisting conditions because of the disaster. Even if spared life and limb, some will still
suffer from mental anguish and many will carry their emotional scars for life.
Problem Statement
Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that the government was still not prepared to
manage logistics in the aftermath of a catastrophic disaster, despite after action reports
from previous disasters, clear storm warnings and several days to prepare prior to
Katrina’s arrival. Furthermore, after Katrina made landfall, there was still a lack of
leadership, communication, and coordination, and resources were often not apportioned
correctly (Committee, 2006: 2). Although there were well established plans, logistics
support during Katrina still performed poorly and appeared to quickly become
uncontrolled. The disaster has been the catalyst for many inquiries as to why things went
wrong in the relief effort and in placing blame on various individuals and organizations.
Although no one level of government or agency is likely to blame for the poor logistics
response to Katrina, this research will focus on the federal government’s response. This
is due in large part because the federal government has the responsibility of providing
support to local and state governments. In short, the federal government is the supplier of
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resources that cannot be arranged by other means. Also, contracting data were selected
as the means of measuring government logistics support. This is because the federal
government contracted out much of its logistics support during Katrina (Cooper, 2005:
Introduction). Furthermore, information regarding the contracts is readily available to the
public, thanks to requirements for government oversight and openness (“Katrina
Contracts,” 2007). The intent of this research is to provide managers with information
concerning disaster logistics dynamics, and introduce tools that can identify
characteristics of this dynamic that may be useful for managers. For instance, can the
data shed light into the disaster environment and identify whether a policy change at a
given point in time will help control events or make them more uncontrollable? Also,
can it identify whether there is a pattern in the disaster relief dynamics that was
overlooked or unrecognized that may indicate how the operation is evolving and how
managerial decisions affect the disaster outcome?
Research Objective
Can an area of complexity science called chaos theory be used to extract useful
information from the Katrina data that will help managers make better logistics decisions
during disaster relief?
Investigative Questions
IQ 1: Does data from Hurricane Katrina exhibit characteristics that can be
explained by chaos theory?
IQ 2: Does this data reveal an underlying pattern that could be useful to
management for decision making?
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IQ 3: Does this data reveal information about the level of control exercised by the
government in awarding contracts during Katrina?
IQ 4: Can the data be used to estimate the extent or limit of logistics support that
would eventually be needed?
Methodology
This research is a case study of federal logistics support during Hurricane Katrina.
It consists of a mixed method design, using quantitative data and analysis in the context
of a qualitative study (Leedy and Ormrod, 2005: 97). It analyzes the data using pattern
matching, which is comparing actual or empirical data to a theoretical model (Yin,
2003:116). In this case, it compares actual contracting data from Hurricane Katrina to
chaos theory models. The unit of analysis is organizational, because it looks at
contracting data from the federal government as a whole.
The first step in implementing the methodology is to collect federal contracting
data from Katrina and prepare this data so that it can be compared to the theoretical
models. Next, two of the most often used chaos theory models will be applied to the
contracting data to evaluate if the data supports the contention that they follow what
would be expected from chaos theory. That is to say, does the data contain deterministic
chaos? Finally, if the analysis supports a pattern of chaos theory, the data will be
analyzed to see if it provides information that could be helpful to managers, such as being
able to use it for diagnostic purposes. For instance, can the data be used to provide
feedback to managers allowing them to determine if decisions they have made are having
a desired effect.
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Assumptions and limitations
This study is a case study of Hurricane Katrina. Therefore, a major limitation to
this study is that it relies on the events of one disaster. Hurricane Katrina is a disaster
that stretched the nation’s ability to cope with the destruction that followed. It is being
looked at singularly to test previous findings based on combined data from multiple
disasters, to see if they also apply to a single disaster. Another limitation is that this
research looks only at logistics processes, and not other functions such as security or
coordinating search and rescue missions. It also assumes Katrina disaster relief can be
looked at meaningful as a whole, rather than, or in addition to, being seen as many
separate, local disasters caused by the same storm.
Finally, since chaos theory is a paradigm through which to view the disaster, it
does not eliminate the possibility that other factors were also present. For instance, if
chaos theory characteristics are present, it does not mean that poor communication was
not a factor. What it does mean is that if future researchers want to evaluate the role of
communication during Katrina, they should also look at it in nonlinear, chaos terms,
rather than strictly in linear terms. For instance, if there is a breakdown in
communication, in linear terms that means the communication process has been broken
and obvious information flow has stopped or has been hindered. Looked at nonlinearly,
the breakdown in communication begins to affect other areas often unexpectedly so that
it has a multiplicative effect.
Implications
The implication of successfully matching empirical data to chaos theory is that it would
indicate disaster events follow non-linear, chaotic dynamics. Initial conditions will have
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a significant affect on disaster relief outcomes some of which will be unexpected. It also
means events that are initially thought to be random processes may actually be
deterministic, albeit complex system interactions. Most importantly, it also means events
that evolve from what appears to be uncontrollable conditions or random events may in
fact be controllable (Glass, 1996:101). The decisions managers make before disaster
strikes and immediately afterwards will have a large impact on the success of the disaster
relief outcome.
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II. Literature Review
There are several valid explanatory theories as to why the logistic response during
Katrina was so poor, and more than one may be applicable, and thereby provide at least a
partial explanation and partial solution to the inefficiencies. Unfortunately, not all
explanations are equally enlightening. In this section, three alternative explanatory
theories are briefly reviewed, along with a rationale for why they were not chosen as the
basis of this research. The theory forming the basis of this research, chaos theory, will
then be discussed with a little more depth, including how it is applicable to disaster
logistics.
Communication
The first explanatory theory to be discussed is communication theory.
Communication theory may help explain why logistics failed during Katrina, and
specifically use Katrina as an example of what happens when the communication process
goes awry. Communication failure was problematic during Katrina, particularly during
the first few days after landfall. Ground and cell phones became inoperable which had a
huge affect on disaster relief. But barring this obvious example, there were other
instances of poor communication. For example, the United States Senate report, “A
Nation Still Unprepared,” identifies that there were no plans in place to provide guidance
on how responders would operate in the event there was no power or the preexisting
communication infrastructure was inoperable. In addition, the National Communication
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System, a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agency, was unprepared to provide
communication support to first responders (Committee, 2006:10-16).
The logistics communication failures that took place during Katrina could also be
looked at in light of the classic communication process. The expected benefit from this
exploration is that by understanding the communication process and why it failed during
Katrina, steps could be taken to mitigate future communication failures in similar
disasters. The result would be improved communication and more effective logistics.
Using the communication process to explain why logistics went poorly during
Katrina has merit, and poor communication has been mentioned in several reports as the
cause for poor disaster relief. In the obvious case of the telephone infrastructure
becoming inoperable, it is easy enough to see that generators powering communications
equipment were not protected well enough against flooding. Providing more robust
protection to backup power sources may be an easy fix in hindsight, if it was merely the
result of assuming the city’s levees would hold. Likewise, internet and satellite
communication proved useful during Katrina disaster relief, therefore, a case might be
made for expanding these capabilities in disaster-prone areas for better communication
redundancy. Other infrastructure problems may exist, such as differing radio frequencies
and nonstandard nomenclature. FEMA is addressing this issue with the establishment of
the National Incident Management System, a standardized plan for disaster response
(“NIMS,” No Date). As can be seen, the communication infrastructure problems are
either being addressed or could be addressed in several different ways.
In other cases, depending on the level of analysis, the root communication
problem may be an example of interpersonal or inter-group communication barriers. For
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practical applications, rather than theoretical, communication problems might therefore
be explored as an aspect of a behavioral science, such as psychology or sociology. A
holistic perspective of behavioral science will be looked at in a later paragraph, as
management or organizational behavior. In either case, it does not appear that exploring
communication as the root cause for the logistic failure during Katrina would provide
information that could directly help managers improve their logistics decision making.
Information Sharing/Supply Chain
Another explanation for why logistics was poor during Katrina is that there were
significant problems within the supply chain, and that by improving the supply chain,
disaster relief could be improved. Supply chain management is a relatively recent
business strategy that has expanded the traditional role of logistics in commercial
businesses. A supply chain is defined as the life cycle processes supporting physical,
informational, financial, and knowledge flows for moving products and services from
suppliers to end users (Ayers, 2004). The Council of Supply Chain Management
Professionals defines supply chain in the following way:
Supply Chain Management encompasses the planning and management of all
activities involved in sourcing and procurement, conversion, and all Logistics
Management activities. Importantly, it also includes coordination and
collaboration with channel partners, which can be suppliers, intermediates, thirdparty service providers, and customers. In essence, Supply Chain Management
integrates supply and demand management within and across companies (Vitasek,
2006).
Proper attention to supply chain management has led to business efficiencies and
has emerged as a means of distinguishing leading companies from their competitors. A
common example of a company using supply chain management to become an industry
leader is Wal-Mart. In his report to congress on lessons learned from Katrina, Dr.
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Leonard from the Harvard Business School praised Wal-Mart, Lowes, and other supply
chain giants for the efficient disaster relief they provided in the aftermath of Katrina. He
says in the report, “Many modern firms are built around excellence in the management of
their supply chains, giving them a high degree of precision in knowledge about what they
have and where it is, together with the capacity to move it efficiently to where it needs to
be delivered” (Leonard, 2006). Supply chain management is a strategy that has been
shown necessary for logistic success even in disaster relief.
Besides the faulty logic of comparing the supply chains of Wal-Mart, a for-profit
enterprise, with a continuing business interest, with the governmental disaster task force
set up specifically to provide disaster aid, exploring Katrina as an example of poor supply
chain management is still problematic. Supply chain management relies on information
sharing. Companies have control over internal supply chain information and share this
information with supply chain partners for their mutual benefit. Unfortunately, based on
government reports, FEMA did not have adequate control of its supply chain information
during Katrina. For instance, it was unable to maintain visibility of assets after initial
deployment or requisition. This results in two major difficulties for researchers. The first
is the obvious need to remedy the lack of asset visibility. This has been identified as an
area of improvement for FEMA, which is already working to resolve the problem (DHS,
2005). The second problem is the lack of empirical data necessary for modeling and
comparing solutions. Consequentially, while looking at Katrina from a supply chain
perspective also has merit, it would be difficult to study with the available data.
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Management/Organizational Behavior
A third explanatory theory for exploring why logistics failed during Katrina is
Organizational Behavior. Organizational Behavior is a combination of several behavioral
sciences used to derive multidisciplinary and often practical insight helpful to managers.
It can be used to help explain why an organization, or individuals within an organization
behave in the matter they do, and more importantly, what changes should be made to the
organization so that desired behavior is more likely (Gibson and all, 2006:6-9). This line
of exploration could lead to many insightful findings about what may have contributed to
logistics failure during Hurricane Katrina.
For example, one type of organizational culture is termed Bureaucratic Culture.
A bureaucratic culture is one that relies on formal control and is focused on internal
processes, organizations that typify this culture include military and government agencies
(Gibson and all, 2006:37-38). This culture may have had an effect on government
disaster relief during Katrina. For instance, DHS including FEMA as well as DoD
appeared hampered by several layers of authority. Both FEMA and DHS were frustrated
by the amount of time it took for DoD to take action on requests for assistance. Even the
White House found the process overly formal and slow, and described the process as the
“21-step” approval process (Committee, 2006: Ch 26, 19). It was also frustrating from
the military perspective; many units were already preparing to assist with the disaster
relief prior to and immediately after landfall of Katrina and were surprised at the lack of
requests for assistance received in the first few days (Committee, 2006: Ch 26, 25).
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Other areas of Organizational Behavior could be explored such as the role
individuals, especially leaders, played in logistics during Katrina. It could also explore
the extent that intergroup behavior and conflict played in Katrina relief logistics.
Organizational Behavior explanations for the failed logistics during Katrina relief
hold promise for many areas of research at all levels of analysis. However the majority
of the research inquiries in this area require an intimate knowledge of either individuals
or organizations involved in Katrina relief operations.
Chaos Theory
The final explanatory model and the one selected for this study is chaos theory.
Chaos theory is part of a larger body of knowledge known as Complexity Science. At its
heart is the idea that what initially looks like random events may actually be part of a
very complex pattern that is practically unpredictable, but that has as its source
nonrandom events. This section will provide a brief background into chaos theory,
provide some characteristics of deterministic chaos systems, and discuss general
applications. It will then briefly describe some specific applications pertinent to this
research. Specifically, it will review the application of chaos theory to management,
supply chain management and disaster management.
Background.
Chaos theory was first hinted at by Henri Poincaré in 1903 in his essay, “Science
and Method.” The King of Sweden had sponsored a contest to provide proof that the
solar system, as modeled by Newtonian physics, was dynamically stable. Unfortunately,
Poincaré was unable to find a complete solution, but as a result of his tremendous work
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was awarded the prize anyway. In his essay, he noted, “small differences in the initial
conditions produce very great ones in the final phenomena” (“Henri,” No Date).
This phenomenon was also experienced by Edward Lorenz, a meteorologist at
MIT. He was working on a computer weather simulation and decided that instead of
restarting a long sequence, he would save time by reentering data from an earlier run of
the sequence at a midway point. However, after about an hour into the new run, Lorenz
noticed that the computer had created an entirely new and completely different weather
pattern from what he had expected. After some investigation, it turned out the data
created the new weather pattern because of rounding. The computer held six decimal
places, but the data reentered only went to three decimal places. The 0.000127 that was
left off the reentered data was enough to create an entirely different weather pattern in the
computer simulation. Lorenz wrote a paper on this phenomenon, which popularized the
effect and thereafter it has been known as the “Butterfly Effect” (“What is Chaos,” No
date).
As a result of Lorenz and Poincaré, scientists and researchers became interested in
this and related phenomenon and their research gave rise to chaos theory. Chaos theory
defines chaos as data that is non-linear and too complex to use for predicting data points,
but has limits and is deterministic. Further research also gave rise to related phenomena
such as Complex Adaptive Systems. These phenomena are generally grouped together as
Complexity Theory/Science (Singh and Singh, 2002:23).
Characteristics.
According to chaos theory, deterministic chaos systems can be classified into two
primary behaviors, stable and chaotic. The area between them is often referred to as the
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“edge of chaos” (Rosenhead, 1998). A stable system is one in which the behavior tends
toward a particular outcome, even when disturbed, it will return to this initial outcome.
That is to say, its outcome is the same as if it would have been had it not been disturbed.
A chaotic system however is one which is sensitive to even small disturbances. A small
disturbance to a chaotic system will result in a different outcome than it would have been
had it not been disturbed. As one would expect, systems at the edge of chaos are flexible,
that is to say, they are easier to change than a stable system, but are not as sensitive as
chaotic systems. In applying chaos theory to management, it is systems at the edge of
chaos that are interesting to most researchers.
Systems of deterministic chaos display the following characteristics: Sensitive to
initial conditions, time irreversibility, attractors, fractional forms/geometry and
bifurcation. The first characteristic, being sensitive to initial conditions, is the one
discovered by Poincaré and Lorenz. It is summed up well by the description of how
Lorenz came upon the phenomenon. This characteristic is also what makes chaos theory
non-linear. The next characteristic is time irreversibility. Systems displaying chaos are
so complex, that the initial conditions often can never be repeated, only nearly so. This is
especially true when looking at natural systems. Attractors are another characteristic.
Attractors are the conditions that the system gravitates towards. In a stable system there
is one attractor. “Edge of chaos” systems have two to eight attractors and in chaotic
systems many attractors. Some are called strange attractors if they lead to an unexpected
result. Attractors can be a single point or a collection of points, such as an orbit (“What
is Chaos,” No date). Figure 1, below, illustrates a two-attractor system. The system can
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be seen to oscillate over time, settling quickly to two y-values. They are approximately
5.6 and 7.7.

0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
Series1
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
1

4

7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49

Figure 1. Illustration of two-attractor system

Fractional forms also called fractional geometry are a visual characteristic of
some deterministic chaos systems. It is a phenomenon in which any section of a curve or
surface appears the same when compared to a magnification of the same image. The
Koch Curve is an example of fractional geometry (Clayton, 1997). This is illustrated
below in figure 2. It can be seen that level two in the figure is merely a reproduction of
the same triangle pattern as the generator level at one-third scale and evenly spaced on
the surfaces. This replication rule, continues through level three and higher levels.
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Triangle
appears at
generator level

Reproduced at
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evenly over
surfaces
Process
continues
indefinitely

Figure 2. Koch Curve (Clayton, 1997)

Another characteristic of deterministic chaos systems and the last to be discussed
is bifurcations. Bifurcations are points where the system becomes so disturbed that the
current number of attractors cannot continue to contain the solutions or behavior, so that
it causes the number of solutions or attractors to double. For instance, if a stable onesolution system becomes disturbed too much it will mutate into a two-solution system. If
the disturbance continues it might bifurcate into a four-solution system. The logistic map
below, in figure 3, illustrates the possible solutions to a system. With low parameter
values, expressed as r in the diagram, one solution is possible. As the value of r increases
to approximately r = 3, the number of possible solutions bifurcates into two solutions.
This process continues to bifurcate until after r = 3.57, when the system cascades into an
indefinitely large number of bifurcations.
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Bifurcation
Points

Figure 3. Bifurcation points on Logistic map (“Bifurcation,” 2006)

Applications.
Chaos theory was first used by mathematicians and physicists to help them
understand turbulence such as found in weather patterns and smoke fumes (“What is
Chaos,” No Date). It later spread to other sciences as varied as biology, ecology, medical
research, psychology, economics, finance, and others (“Chaos and Complexity,” 2006).
This research is analyzing the use of chaos theory to help managers in logistics provide
more efficient disaster relief. Therefore, applications important to this research are
management and specifically supply chain management and disaster management.
As mentioned above, chaos theory in its early application tended to be technical
and used mathematical models as the basis of research. However, some researchers have
since applied the theory to situations in which data could not be quantitatively captured.
In the literature this is often referred to as a metaphorical use of chaos theory
(Clayton,1997). Although using chaos theory metaphorically can be helpful in
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developing models or creating new paradigms to help understand complex situations, it
tends to be more subjective than quantitative applications.
Chaos theory when applied to management and decision making usually takes one
of two forms. The first is to provide insight into management strategies that are more
effective than traditional means, given deterministic chaos is in the system. The other is
how managers can use information from businesses to control companies in edge of
chaos environments. Most management applications of chaos theory are as metaphorical
models. In a metaphorical model, the researcher will analyze a managerial environment
or condition and described it in terms of characteristics of chaos theory, even though the
condition cannot be measured. For instance, if the condition can be described as being
sensitive to change and having the potential for unpredictable results, the researcher
would infer that deterministic chaos is present. Furthermore, if deterministic chaos is
present, it infers that what is true for chaos theory systems may be true of the managerial
condition.
The first study suggests that chaos theory is an appropriate model to analyze
management, because the reality of organizations and their environments have changed
while assumptions about them have not. For instance, three assumptions typically made
about companies are that they are closed systems, the environment is stable, and there are
clear management actions that have clear and predictable results. The reality, according
to Glass is different. In his study, he suggests that all organizations are complex and
affected by their environment, the organizations’ environment is rapidly changing, and
cause and effect relationships are not always clear (Glass, 1996).
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An example provided in his study is that given a traditional, linear view of
business, an increase in advertising expenditures results in increased sales (within the
laws of diminishing returns). However, in reality an increase in advertising might push a
competitor to develop a more effective advertising campaign that results in the original
company experiencing lower sales than the original condition. Glass refers to this
phenomenon as a vicious cycle, which he explains is a system spiraling toward negative,
often unexpected outcomes. A virtuous cycle on the other hand is when the phenomenon
results in the system spiraling toward positive outcomes (Glass, 1996).
As a result of his research, Glass finds that managers should acknowledge the
inherently nonlinear condition of management and organizational dynamics and make
adjustments to their management style. For instance, managers should move away from
trying to stabilize their present condition, such as maintaining a certain percentage of
market share, and instead focus their attention on the rapid shifts in their environment
which might become amplified, that is become opportunities they can seize. Another
management change is more flexibility in direction. For example, rather than initiating a
detailed top-down strategy, managers should provide clear organizational goals.
Management should also cultivate a learning environment with empowered employees to
improve its likelihood of seizing opportunities as they arise (Glass, 1996). Glass’s
conclusions are similar to that of other researchers into chaos theory applications in
management (Young and Kiel, 1994; Singh and Singh, 2002:23).
Another study shows that chaos theory goes against the traditional view of
management, which is to provide formal control in a stable environment. Instead, as with
Glass, Young and Kiel suggest that decentralized control and a quick, responsive
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workforce is in more harmony with chaos theory ideals. Young and Kiel summarizes the
role of the manager this way, “The task of the postmodern manager is to expedite
bifurcations which produce desirable attractors and, at the same time, to control key
parameters to stabilize such outcome states for a firm while framing organizational policy
in such a way as to not destabilize the larger political economy” (Young and Kiel, 1994).
Another study provides a critique of applying complexity theory to management.
It discusses whether complexity science should be applied to management and if so, its
limitations. In his study, Rosenhead finds that management topics, unlike hard sciences,
cannot be proven. Management concepts are either empirically supported or not.
Furthermore, much of the quantitative research is based on computer simulations which
are then analyzed to see how well they mimic empirical observations, rather than being
based on the empirical observations themselves. So Rosenhead claims that while
research applying complexity science to management assumes universal applicability of
the results, they are open to debate on how representative they really are. Rosenhead also
makes a distinction between the metaphorical use of complexity science, and its use as an
analogy. For instance, he gives the example of using an automobile as a metaphor for the
economy by using terms such as, “applying the brakes” or “a touch on the accelerator,” to
describe actions affecting the economy. He doubts anyone using a metaphor in this way
would use it as the basis to change to the system. It just makes the underlying concept
being analyzed clearer (Rosenhead, 1998). As an analogy however, complexity science
might be more useful than a metaphor. Many important scientific breakthroughs have
been the result of using a known phenomenon as a predictive model to analyze a new
one. Unfortunately, Rosenhead concludes that complexity science does not meet key
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criteria that are needed to use it as an analogy for management. Among the needed
criteria is that complexity science should be more understood than management theory
and that there should be precise similarities between the two phenomena. Rosenhead
does however provide hope that this inapplicability is not a permanent condition. He
writes, “This situation could well change, as complexity theory develops further, or as
management complexity writers refine their analysis. However, at present the conceptual
basis seems inadequate to support testable analogical insights” (Rosenhead, 1998).
Chaos theory has also been specifically applied to supply chain management. For
the most part, this research has been in two areas. First, it has been applied to the
amplification of errors within a supply chain, a phenomenon that has been termed the
“bullwhip effect.” It has also been applied to the phenomenon in complexity science in
which systems develop order out of disorder. This is referred to as self-organization
(Wilding, 2006; Choi and others, 2001: 351). The case of error amplification is more
applicable to this study. It is an example of a system that is sensitive to initial conditions,
not unlike the findings of Poincaré and Lorenz.
In the first example, Wilding addresses a problem that could arise as a result of
managers attempting to keep their supply inventories levels too low. In his study,
Wilding used an automated smoothing technique to control inventory levels; a common
means companies use to control their supply levels. The algorithm resulted in using old
forecast data for making new forecasts, which caused errors to be amplified. The result
was chaos or instability being introduced into the system. Wilding writes, “a system that
is meant to control fluctuations, and consequently buffer the system from instability, can
create dynamics that turn a stable demand pattern into one that is unpredictable with
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occasional explosive changes in demand” (Wilding, 2006: 5). Wilding reports in his
research that it is corroborated by the inventory management study of John Sterman from
MIT. Sterman found that when policies to lower inventories are introduced, costs could
increase by as much as 500 percent higher than optimum as a result of stock outages and
erratic ordering (Wilding, 2006).
The phenomenon of error amplification has also been studied by other
researchers. For instance, Laugesen and Mosekilde analyzed this phenomenon in the
BEER Game. The BEER game is a management game developed at the Sloan School of
Management. The game is played by individuals or teams who assume the role of a
particular link in the supply chain, such as producer, wholesaler, or distributor. The retail
player orders “beer” from the wholesaler, based on customer demand. The wholesaler
then orders beer from the distributor, and this process continues up through the supply
chain to the producer. Each link has a built in delay, which causes demand amplification
or the bullwhip effect that characterizes the game. In their study, computer simulations
of the BEER game were made and the results examined. Laugesen and Mosekilde found
interesting forms of bifurcations, and other elements characteristic of deterministic chaos
systems in their simulations. In the conclusion of their study, Laugesen and Mosekilde
report similarities between their simulations and actual economic dynamics. They
believe the oscillations in the systems they studied, significantly contribute to the
formation of business cycles (Laugesen and Mosekilde, 2006).
Chaos theory has also been applied to disasters and crisis. These studies have
looked at chaos both metaphorically and quantitatively. For instance, in the first study
chaos theory is applied metaphorically to public relations during disasters. One of the
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points Murphy makes in her study is that an organization may be able to influence
disaster events up to a point, after which it becomes uncontrollable. She writes, “chaos
theory stress that these cataclysmic moments are not random, but rather the culmination
of accumulated ‘noise’ within the system itself. Put another way, certain organizations
contain flaws within themselves that amplify over time to self-generate crisis independent
of outside factors” (Murphy, 1996: 106). Murphy suggests that it may be possible to
control change, by influencing the system prior to the point when the system enters
chaos. That is to say, to influence the system while it is still at the edge of chaos. Using
the example of the Exxon Valdez oil spill off the coast of Alaska, Murphy explains that
Exxon was criticized for not taking control of the oil spill, quickly and missing the
opportunity for creating a positive public opinion. This is contrasted to the actions of
Johnson & Johnson. After the Tylenol tampering scare, Johnson & Johnson’s quick
action led to a positive public outcome rather than the negative one as with Exxon.
Murphy also points out the affects of strange attractors. Using rumors as an example, she
points out, “Organizations often try to combat rumors with facts. However, if rumors are
indeed chaotic systems, facts will have little permanent effect against the underlying
cultural anxieties that govern response to a given product, company, or technology”
(Murphy, 1996: 107). In other words, the rumor is a reflection of the dominant cultural
attitude. It is the attractor or point of stability and can only be changed when there is a
bifurcation of the cultural attitude.
Another study used a quantitative approach to apply chaos theory to disaster
management. This research was presented at a conference in May 1995, entitled, “What
Disaster Response Management Can Learn from Chaos Theory.” Two researchers,
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Priesmeyer and Cole, presented a paper in which they use a logistic regression model to
analyze a data set of 257 respondents in 106 different disaster events. The equation used
in the model is the logistic equation which is also known as the predator-prey equation.
The equation contains one variable, referred to as X in Priesmeyer and Cole’s study and
one parameter, k. The logistic equation is then fitted to the empirical data at various kand X-values to find the best values to fit the data. Comparing the empirical data to the
theoretical model resulted in an F-value of 6.75, which was significant at the 95 percent
confidence level. Their research resulted in a k-value of 3.66 during the first 24-hours,
which is near 3.7; the number they report as the threshold of chaos in their model. They
interpret the value of k to indicate the level of stability in the environment. Priesmeyer
and Cole concluded that their results provide quantitative evidence that disaster response
is nonlinear and has characteristic of deterministic chaos. They report the k value of 3.66
is an ideal level, because it indicates that disaster response was flexible but not chaotic.
Their conclusion is, “chaos which results during these first 24 hours is a necessary and
desirable condition which accommodates adaptation, cross-communication, the
suspension of rules or policies, and other emergent behavior essential to an efficient
response” (Priesmeyer and Cole, 1996).
In the same paper, Priesmeyer and Cole provide a management tool to evaluate
the evolution of disaster response by analyzing the change of two closely related
resources over time. Their study used the need for Emergency Medical System (EMS)
personnel and equipment and firefighting personnel/equipment as the two related
resources. The change in resources is plotted on a Cartesian plane, and analyzed as to
whether there is an increase or decrease in the change in demand of each resource. The
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quadrant in which the change is plotted determines the direction of growth of the disaster
response (Priesmeyer and Cole, 1996).
The same May 1995 conference also provided information on how social time
impacts chaos theory and self-organization. Social time is the concept that the
responders’ perception of time, and not just the time that has actually elapsed, has
significance. The conclusion of the attendees at the conference is that managers could
learn several things from chaos theory. For instance, they learn that disaster response
should be flexible and adaptive. Other lessons are that managers should look for
fluctuations which might indicate bifurcation points, managers should be catalysts of
change deliberately causing bifurcations, and disaster infrastructure should be flexible
enough to allow response to self-organize (Koehler, 1996).
Limitations.
Although chaos theory provides insight into disaster relief, it has limitations as
well. First, as with any model, it is an approximation of reality and not the reality itself.
There are likely other models that could provide insight into a different aspect of disaster
relief. It is unlikely that any one model will be able to explain every aspect of reality. A
second limitation is not every organization that provides disaster relief is affected by the
disaster in the same way. Some organizations may be heavily stressed, while others play
periphery roles (Koehler, 1996). Finally, disasters are naturally complex. Consequently,
other problems may exist. For instance, if inter-organizational conflict is present, it may
or may not represent a condition that leads to instability, but chaos theory does not
address the root cause of the conflict.
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The quantitative examples provided by Priesmeyer and Cole presented at the May
1995 conference were based on data from several disasters combined together rather than
looking at them one at a time, unlike the present study. Comparing chaos theory models
to federal contracting data during Katrina should provide insight into the logistics failures
during Katrina. The comparison should be able to discriminate between whether the
failure was due to random events, or instead by poor management decisions. If the later
is the case, then it may be possible to control events through changes made by
knowledgeable managers.
There are other valid theories to explain why the logistic response during Katrina
was so poor. Furthermore, these theories may provide at least a partial explanation and
solution to logistics inefficiencies. However, not all explanations are equally
enlightening. This section provided background into three alternative explanatory
theories with a rationale for why they were not chosen as the basis for this research. It
also provided a description of chaos theory, the model chosen for this study.

28

III. Methodology
Overview
The objective of this study is to answer the research question: Can an area of
complexity science called chaos theory be used to extract useful information from the
Katrina contracting data that will help managers make better logistics decisions during
disaster relief? The methodology chosen for this research is a case study. Yin mentions
that a case study is an appropriate research methodology for explanatory studies, when
researchers want to answer questions relating to “how” or “why” and do not require
control of behavioral events. Furthermore, he provides an example of when this
approach is appropriate, “Thus if you wanted to know how a community successfully
overcame the negative impact . . . you would be less likely to rely on a survey or an
examination of archival records and might be better off doing a history or case study”
(Yin, 2003:6). This study analyzes whether chaos theory is useful in “explaining” the
poor logistics support during Hurricane Katrina and might also provide useful insights for
managers making logistics decisions. Just as Priesmeyer and Cole’s research found the
presence of deterministic chaos in general disaster relief, this study should provide
insight into whether there is evidence of deterministic chaos in a specific catastrophic
disaster, Hurricane Katrina. If deterministic chaos is present, it would indicate that initial
conditions of disaster response would have a significant affect on the relief’s outcome,
and furthermore some of the events which are thought to be random or evolve from
uncontrollable earlier events may actually be controllable. If this is the case, then the
success or failure of logistics support during disaster relief operations relies in large part
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on the decisions logistics managers make prior to, and during the initial onset of the
disaster.
This study relies on a mixed method design. A mixed method design combines
quantitative and qualitative components in research (Leedy and Ormrod, 2005: 97). In
this study, quantitative data was obtained on the federal contracts awarded in support of
Hurricane Katrina. This data will be analyzed using pattern matching, which is
comparing actual or empirical data to a theoretical model (Yin, 2003:116). The
theoretical model in this case is chaos theory. The case study design and questions,
however, are qualitative in nature. The quantitative results of the research will be used to
answer qualitative questions, and therefore, the mixed method design of this study.
Federal contracts related to Katrina were chosen as the source data for two
reasons. First, it appears an appropriate means of quantifying federal logistics activity.
Federal agencies rely on contracting to bridge the gap between what is needed from the
agency and what they are able to provide with internal resources. This is especially true
in the case for logistics commodities and services. According to David Cooper, Director,
Acquisition and Sourcing Manger in the Government Accountability Office (GAO),
federal agencies are increasing the trend of contracting out work. Federal agencies
responding to Katrina provides a case in point. Cooper reports, “The government’s
response to Katrina and Rita, for example, depended heavily on contractors to deliver ice,
water, and food supplies as well as the effort to patch rooftops and supply temporary
housing to displaced residents and evacuees” (Cooper, 2005: Introduction). The second
reason is that the data is readily available. The contracting data from Katrina are
available from the Federal Procurement Data System-New Generation (FPDS-NG).
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These data are also publicly assessable, which increases the ability for other researchers
to replicate or verify the study (“Katrina Contracts,” 2007). Since, the contracting data is
federal government-wide, the unit of analysis for this study is organizational.
Data
Although the contracting data from the FPDS-NG is publicly assessable, it comes
with a disclaimer, “Many contracting offices supporting Katrina, particularly those
relocated to the disaster recovery area, do not have access to their normal contract writing
systems and thus have not been able to populate FPDS-NG contemporaneously with the
contract awards they have made. Others have not had time to enter data due to the tempo
of operations. It is impossible to estimate the impact this may have on the total numbers”
(“Katrina Contracts,” 2007). The data used in this study was current as of 4 January 2007
and is assumed to have the majority of the contracts awarded during Katrina, albeit this is
a limitation of the data. The full database contains 13,907 contracts awarded by 22
departments, some representing several federal agencies. Out of this database, only
contracts effective between 28 August and 5 November 2005 are used. The narrowed
database covers the first ten weeks of relief effort, beginning 28 August. This date was
chosen, because it was the last day that had zero contracts awarded prior to the main
Katrina relief effort. All the dates in the study contained data with values greater than
zero. The narrowed database used in this study contains 5,544 contracts.
The contracting data used in the study are both the number of contracts which
became effective on a given day and the total dollar value of the contracts that became
effective on that day. These values became the measures of interest in this study. A
preliminary study was also conducted using the contracting pay categories, or value
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bands. The use of value bands as a means of analyzing the data will be discussed further
in Chapter 4, Results and Analysis.
After the data were collected, they needed to be prepared for analysis. Scale was
a concern when using the number-of-contracts and contract-values data in the same
equation. It also became a concern when using the logistic equation which requires data
values between zero and one. So, a means to normalize the data needed to be found.
The typical method of normalizing data used in the logistic equation, when it is used to
estimate populations, is to calculate it as the percent of the maximum possible population
for each point in the time series. So for instance, if the maximum population for a
particular environment is one million, and the value at a given point in time is 500,000,
then the data would be measured as 0.50 or 50%. Since the maximum number of
contracts and the maximum available funds for contracts on a given day is not known,
another means of normalizing the empirical data needed to be found.
The solution chosen was to measure each day’s value as a percent. The total
activity for all seven weeks and weekly totals were both used as denominators in
calculating percents. The percentage was calculated differently depending on the system
being modeled. For instance, in the case of analyzing a ten-week system all 70 days of
the data points were used to determine the daily value. Each day was a percent of the
total amount for all 70 days, this can written as:
70

Pi = xi/∑xi

(1)

i=1

Were Pi is the percent at a given (i) day, and x is the value at a given (i) day.
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For the one-week system models, the percent was calculated using weekly totals
to calculate daily values. This method can be described as:
7

Pi = xi/∑xi

(2)

i=1

As with the previous formula, Pi is the percent at a given (i) day, and x is the value at a
given (i) day.
The data generated by the logistic equation was similarly normalized by
calculating it as a percent using the same method as with the empirical data. So for
instance, if the empirical data is measured as the percent of the total for the week, the
data generated by the logistic equation was likewise measured as a percent of the total for
the week. This allows a comparison of the chaos model with the empirical data using the
same scale.
There is a rationale for measuring the disaster relief time series both as ten-week
systems and as one-week systems. As dynamic as logistic support is during disaster
relief, the system is likely being adjusted and continually changed. To illustrate, consider
contracting agents. They award contracts based on particular needs and then will
evaluate whether the contracting activity was able to meet those needs. Further
contracting activity will then attempt to either readdress needs not initially met, or meet
new needs. Each time this redirection takes place, it changes the system. The
significance of this is that the system may be continually changing and it may not be
possible to describe the whole ten-week system with one parameter. Because of this, the
data for the first ten weeks will be looked at both as ten-week systems and as one-week
systems.

33

The reason one-week systems were chosen is because there is a compromise in
trying to capture the dynamics of a continuously changing system and having enough
data points to make a comparison. Considering it is common to look at our personal and
professional lives in terms of days, weeks, and months; taking a slice of the time series at
weekly intervals seems a natural choice. Looking at the data by week might be
exemplified by managers who use weekly staff meetings for feedback to make
adjustments in their decisions and policies. In this study, the week runs from Sunday to
Saturday.
Investigative Questions
To meet the objective of this research and guide the study, investigative questions
were developed. These questions are:
IQ 1: Does federal contracting data from Hurricane Katrina exhibit
characteristics that can be explained by chaos theory?
IQ 2: Does this data reveal an underlying pattern that could be useful to
management for decision making?
IQ 3: Does this data reveal information about the level of control exercised by the
federal government in awarding contracts during Katrina?
IQ 4: Can the data be used to estimate the extent or limit of logistics support that
would eventually be needed during disaster relief?
Answering investigative questions
The investigative questions will not be present in numerical order. Investigative
question three provides detail on the characteristics and dynamics of the logistic equation,
which is used to generate the data for the theoretical model in the embedding process.
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The embedding process is used to answer investigative question one. Therefore,
investigative question three will be addressed first, which will allow the basics of the
logistic equation to be explained and allow readers a better understanding of the
principles being used in later applications of the equation.
Investigative Question 3.
Does this data reveal information about the level of control exercised by federal
agencies in awarding contracts during Katrina?
The logistic equation was chosen to analyze the amount of control in the system,
because it is one of many models that can be used for this purpose. In addition,
Priesmeyer and Cole used it specifically with disaster response to verify that the data
reflected, what they would consider, an appropriate level of stability/control during the
first twenty-four hours of disaster relief (Priesmeyer and Cole, 1996). The logistic
equation was initially used to describe population growth, but has since been applied to
other phenomenon such as in economics and organizational science (Zimm, 2005). The
logistic equation contains a parameter that quantifies the amount of stability in the
environment, in this study it will be identified by the symbol lambda, “λ.” At lower
parameters the logistic equation data exhibits stability, as the parameter increases so does
the sensitivity of the system to change. If deterministic chaos is present in a natural or
empirical system, it is expected that when it is compared to the logistic equation, the
parameter-λ would reflect a value that equates to the amount of stability in the system.
The logistic equation cascades into chaos, at parameter values above 3.57, and would
indicate a lack of control in the system being analyzed. Systems under 3.57 indicate

35

stable or edge of chaos conditions which is indicative of controlled systems (Priesmeyer
and Cole, 1996; Harrison, 2006; Clayton, 1997).
The logistic equation is expressed as:
Xn+1 = λXn(1-Xn)

(3)

In the equation Xn+1 represents the value of the next point in the time series, Xn is the
value of the current point in the time series, 1-Xn is a suppression element and λ is the
control parameter. As originally used to describe the population growth, the population
of the next generation is represented by Xn+1, the current population is represented Xn,
and 1-Xn takes into account the effects of overfeeding, overcrowding, deaths, and so
forth. The population growth is represented by the λ-parameter. The range of values for
X in the logistic equation is between 0 and 1, and is a measure of the percent of the
maximum population the environment can support. The range of values for λ is between
0 and 4. The reason the equation is closely associated with chaos theory is the interesting
variation in results mentioned above that occur with different λ-parameter values. With a
parameter value less than one, the population will stabilize at zero. That is to say, the
population is not sustainable and dies out. At parameter values between 1 and 3 the
population will stabilize to one attractor. Values larger than 3 begin to bifurcate first
oscillating between two points, then four, then eight, until at a parameter value of 3.57
after which the number of bifurcations begins to oscillate between so many attractor
points that it becomes chaotic (Priesmeyer and Cole, 1996; Harrison, 2006; Clayton,
1997).
In their application of the logistic equation, Priesmeyer and Cole used the amount
of responder activity during a particular time frame, probably one hour, as X. (The actual

36

measure of time was unclear in the literature.) The time series was plotted for the first
twenty-four hours and fitted to a logistic equation to determine the best X-variable and λparameter. Their study found a statistically significant similarity between the empirical
disaster response data and the logistic equation. The parameter was interpreted as the
amount of amount of stability within the disaster environment. Priesmeyer and Cole’s
model provides a basis of what to expect in disaster relief in general. If, however, the
model is used for short slices of a time series, it allows managers to understand how
stable the system is initially and how their decisions might affect the disaster response.
More importantly, managers can make adjustments at the end of each time series slice
using the logistic equation as a feedback source on the measure of stability and affect
activity during subsequent time periods. For instance, if managers realize the
environment is near chaos, they could avoid initiating policies which might increase the
instability. If Katrina data is found to exhibit λ-parameter values under 3.57, it would
indicate a stable system or one near the edge of chaos and therefore managers were in
control of the system. Values over 3.57 would indicate a loss of control. This would
indicate an inability for managers to initially cope with the disaster.
Investigative Question 1.
Does federal contracting data from Hurricane Katrina exhibit characteristics that
can be explained by chaos theory?
Embedding is an appropriate means of analyzing data from Katrina to see if it
contains evidence of deterministic chaos (James, 1996:44). Embedding was selected
because it is a simple process, yet effective in revealing deterministic chaos. It uses a
single time series to represent more than one dimension in the plot of a dynamic system.
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The process consists of taking two consecutive points in a time series, to create a vector,
then plotting them on a Cartesian plane. The number of points in the time series used to
determine one data point on the plot defines the number of dimensions that will be
plotted. For instance, given a time series of a, b, c, d, and e; three dimensions could be
plotted by assigning x-, y-, and z-coordinates as illustrated below in table 1 (James,
1996:44: Clayton, 1997; Shockley, 2005: 150):

Table 1. Assigning values to x, y, and z for 3-diminsional embedding

Plot data point

x-coordinate

y-coordinate

z-coordinate

1

a

b

c

2

b

c

d

3

c

d

e

Examples of time series known to exhibit deterministic chaos and known to be
random are provided below to illustrate the differences in the dynamics of two types of
systems. The logistic equation was used to generate data that characterizes deterministic
chaos.
In the first plot, data was generated by the logistic equation using X = 0.5 and λ =
2.9 and is illustrated below in figure 4. The λ-parameter = 2.9 describes a system with a
one-point attractor, it can be seen in figure 4 that the data oscillates before it quickly
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settles down to its stability point, or attractor. This movement is similar to a pendulum
coming to rest after being disturbed.

Chaos Plot
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0.7

0.6

0.5

Stabilizes at onepoint attractor
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0
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Figure 4. Time series of logistic equation, X = 0.5, λ = 2.9

The same data plotted in figure 4, is embedded in three dimensions in the plot illustrated
in figure 5. Note that the line created by the data becomes denser toward the center. This
is where the system stabilizes to its attractor.
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Figure 5. Three-dimensional plot of embedded time series, X = 0.5, λ = 2.9

A time series for a logistic equation using X = 0.5 and λ = 3.7 is illustrated below
in figure 6. The λ-parameter is at the level where the system has become chaotic. The
plot of the system in figure 6 shows some pattern initially but quickly dissipates over
time and is lost.
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Figure 6. Time series of logistic equation, X = 0.5, λ = 3.7

When the same data used in figure 6 is embedded in three dimensions and plotted a
pattern is seen. It appears to be an “S” shape, or curve. This can be seen in figure 7,
below.
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Figure 7. Three-dimensional plot of embedded time series, X = 0.5, λ = 3.7

Even a time series with a λ-parameter level near the upper limit of possible outcomes, X
= 0.5 and λ = 3.99, shows a pattern when embedded. A plot of the time series appears in
figure 8. There is less of a pattern apparent in this plot, than of the one in figure 6, but a
careful look reveals some oscillation in the beginning before it becomes chaotic.
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Figure 8. Time series of logistic equation, X = 0.5, λ = 3.99

The embedded time series of the same data used to create the plot in figure 8 is illustrated
in figure 9. The three-dimensional pattern in the embedded plot appears to form a
continuation of the shape in figure 7. It looks as if the curve loops back around forming a
boomerang shape.
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Figure 9. Three-dimensional plot of embedded time series, X = 0.5, λ = 3.99

As can be seen in all of the embedded plots of data generated by the logistic equation, a
process which is known to generate data with deterministic chaos, a distinctive pattern
emerges. In the cases illustrated, they can appear as a line, an “S” shape, or boomerang
shape. In contrast, figure 10 illustrates an embedded time series of random data, taken
from a normal distribution. The data appears as a cloud clustered toward the center of the
plot with no other pattern.
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Figure 10. Three-dimensional plot of embedded random, normal dist. time series

In this study, the empirical data from Katrina contracts will be embedded in three
dimensions, and then will be visually inspected. If the data is composed primarily of
deterministic chaos, the data should create a distinctive pattern similar to the results
illustrated above in figures 5, 7 and 9. If however, the empirical data resembles the
embedded plot illustrated above in figure 10, it would not support the conclusion that
there was deterministic chaos in the Katrina data.
Investigative Question 2.
Does this data reveal an underlying pattern that could be useful to management
for decision making?
If an analysis of data is found to contain deterministic chaos, the usefulness of this
information is limited to knowing that the events were not random, but deterministic and
possibly controllable. This information may be helpful in creating a new paradigm, but
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not in everyday management decisions. If a system exhibits deterministic chaos, the next
question becomes how to control the events. How can managers determine when a
system might undergo a bifurcation, or system change, and what should they do to affect
the outcome? Logistics managers need information that they can use to make better
logistics decisions.
Two types of limit-cycle models and a velocity plot were chosen as a means of
providing feedback to managers on the disaster relief dynamics. These were chosen
because one of the limit-cycle models was specifically identified by Priesmeyer and Cole
as a means of management feedback for disaster response. They used the model on the
combined disaster data, but the question remains, if it can be used by managers for a
specific disaster. This is the use apparently intended by Priesmeyer and Cole (Priesmeyer
and Cole, 1996). This model will be referred to as the disaster limit-cycle model. The
other limit-cycle model and velocity plot are similar to the first model. They were used
by Priesmeyer and Baik in another study using the limit-cycle model in a business
application. The other limit-cycle model will be referred to as the business limit-cycle
model. Since the business model limit-cycle was developed first, it will be discussed
first. Both types of limit-cycle models and the velocity plot, require two related
variables. In their business model, Priesmeyer and Baik used quarterly profits and sales
as the related variables. In the disaster model, Priesmeyer and Cole used fire
equipment/personnel and Emergency Medical System (EMS) equipment/personnel as the
related variables.
In addition to these models, fitting the logistic equation to empirical data can
provide feedback to the manager on the amount stability present in the environment, and
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therefore the amount of control that may be possible. The logistic equation model will
however, be discussed later.
Priesmeyer and Baik claim that the business model limit-cycle and velocity plots
can be used by managers to predict organizational performance to improve corporate
decision making (Priesmeyer and Baik, 1989:47). This is done in a multi-step process to
first determine the points to plot for a limit-cycle, then to determine the points to create
the velocity plot. The first step in their business cycle model is to calculate the marginal
or change in values for each variable:
dij = xij – xi-1,j

(4)

Where d is the difference between consecutive points, x is the value of the variable at a
particular point in the time series, identified by subscript i. The point just previous is
subscript i-1, and subscript j identifies the variable, for instance sales or profit. Next the
mean value of the differences is calculated:
n

µj = ∑dij/n-1

(5)

i=1

Where µj is the mean of the differences, ∑dij is the sum of for all i for a particular
variable j, and n represent the total number of observations of i (that is the number of
points along the time series). The next step is to subtract the mean difference from each
individual point differences resulting in the difference from the mean Dij:
Dij = dij - µj

(6)

The next step is to plot the data for the limit-cycle. The first point plotted is x = µj
and y = µj+1 (x is the mean difference of the first variable, profit for example, and y is the
mean difference of the second variable, for example sales). Then, the difference from the
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mean (Dij) for the first j, is paired with the difference from the mean (Dij+1) for the second
j to create consecutive x and y variables for each point. These points are then plotted to
create the limit-cycle plot.
The velocity plot is constructed by taking the two difference from the means (Dij
and Dij+1) and multiplying them together to create the y-variable. The x-variable is the
time component, such as the first quarter, second quarter, third quarter, and so on. The xand y-variables are then plotted (Priesmeyer and Baik, 1989:16).
The results of the plots are then visually observed. Some companies in
Priesmeyer and Baik’s study exhibited a one-period attractor, which on the limit-cycle
plot appears ideally as data concentrated near the origin at a single-point. These
businesses had zero velocity (horizontal line). Others businesses exhibited a two-period
cycle, which was characterized by a diagonal line oscillating between points in the first
and third Cartesian plane quadrants on the limit-cycle plot. The ideal velocity plot for
two-point limit-cycle businesses oscillated between two regular points (zero and another
value). The last group of regular business cycles was businesses with four-period limitcycles. The ideal plot of four-period limit-cycle is a shape similar to the symbol for
infinity or an eight on its side. The ideal velocity is a line oscillating between four
regular points (Priesmeyer and Baik, 1989:17-19).
Likewise, Priesmeyer and Cole developed a simpler process for plotting a limitcycle by using changes in two variables. For instance, the change in fire
equipment/personnel would be the x-variable and change in EMS equipment/personnel
would be the y-variable. The x, y pair would then be plotted on a Cartesian plane to
reveal information about the development of disaster relief. If the plotted data moves
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into the first quadrant (positive x and y), then managers would see that the need for both
resources were growing. They could monitor the situation closely to see if it comes close
to maximizing available resources, in which case they would need to request assistance.
So, rather than looking for patterns as in the business limit-cycle model, the plotted data
in the disaster model are used to diagnosis whether more or less resources are being
utilized, possibly indicating a change in the disaster response development. As with the
above example, it may also provide an early warning of when the activities are likely to
go beyond the limit of available resources, necessitating a request for assistance
(Priesmeyer and Cole, 1996).
Investigative Question 4.
Can the data be used to estimate the extent or limit of logistics support that would
eventually be needed?
In a system characterized by deterministic chaos, information to discover the
limits can come from the models already identified; therefore, additional models were not
explored. Analysis of the results from the business and disaster model limit-cycles and
fitting the logistic equation can provide information that could be used to determine the
limit of support that would be needed. For instance, in the business and disaster model
limit-cycle if the data reflects a regular limit-cycle, such as a period-one or period-two
limit-cycle, then the limits of logistics support is established by the attractor/s. That is to
say, the limit is identified by the point or the points between which the data oscillates.
Likewise, the logistic equation can be used to map system performance and predict its
limit. If the logistic equation is accurately fit to the data (significant F-value), and is able

49

to explain much of the variation (reasonable R2-value) then the λ-parameter can be used
to identify the system limit.
Methodology conclusion
In conclusion, this research is a case study of federal logistics support during
Hurricane Katrina. It is concerned with analyzing data from federal contracts awarded in
support of Katrina to discover if they might contain information useful for logistics
managers and help them in decision-making in future catastrophic disaster relief. The
research design is a mixed methodology. The data preparation prior to being used to
compare the chaos theory models to the empirical data was discussed. Several chaos
theory models used in this research were examined, specifically the logistic equation,
embedding, and business and disaster limit-cycle models and velocity plot. It also
discussed why these chaos theory models were selected.
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IV. Results and Analysis
The objective of this study is investigate whether an area of complexity science
called chaos theory can be used to extract useful information from the Katrina contracting
data which can help managers make better logistics decisions during disaster relief. This
chapter will apply the methodology discussed in the previous chapter to the empirical
data from the federal contracting database. First, the raw data will be examined to see if
any patterns or other distinct characteristics are present, then the data will be transformed
for analysis and compared to the theoretical models. The first chaos model to be
examined is the logistic equation, followed by the embedding process, then the limitcycle models and velocity plot. There are two limit cycle models used, the business
model and the disaster model. The results from each of the models will be summarize to
answer the investigative questions. Finally, a conclusion of the results and analysis is
provided.
Raw Data
The first step was to plot the raw contract data, and examine them for patterns or
other features. The plot of raw data for contract-values (in dollars) is given in figure 11.
As can be seen there is a particularly large spike in data on 2 September 2005. On this
day, approximately $750 million worth of contracts became effective. This is accounted
for by one contract valued at $250 million and by the aggregation of 869 less costly
contracts. Looking at the timeline of events during Katrina, this corresponds to the day
after Michael Brown, the head of FEMA, said he found out about evacuees in the
Convention Center and that he had not heard of reports of rioting and violence (“Big
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disconnect,” 2005). It was also the same day congress approved an initial Katrina relief
package for $10.5 billion (“Congress,” 2005).

Contract Value - Raw Data
800,000,000.00

2 Sept. 2005
700,000,000.00

600,000,000.00

500,000,000.00

400,000,000.00

300,000,000.00

200,000,000.00

100,000,000.00

0.00
1

3

5

7

9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 55 57 59 61 63 65 67 69
Contract Value

Figure 11. Plot of raw data for contract values (in dollars)

The plot of the raw number-of-contracts data becoming effective on a given day is
shown in figure 12. As can be seen in this plot, there is a spike in contract numbers on 2
September and 30 September 2005. On 2 September 870 contracts became effective; of
this number, 742 were awarded by FEMA and categorized as Firefighters/Community
relations (“Katrina Contracts,” 2007). The events related to this date are discussed above.
The other spike occurred 30 September 2005, which coincides with the end of the federal
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government’s 2005 fiscal year. This date did not have any significant Katrina events
associated with it, so the anomaly is probably related to the end of the fiscal year
activities. There is also a noticeable pattern in the number-of-contracts data. This is
created by a decrease every Sunday in the number of contracts becoming effective.
There is also a relationship between the number-of-contracts data and the value,
as one might suspect; however it was not a one-to-one correlation. An analysis of the
data correlation between contract numbers and contract-values data is 0.72, based on the
raw data.
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Figure 12. Plot of raw number-of-contracts data
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Value Bands
The value bands used in the preliminary study were based on the categories
established by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). For instance, micropurchases
are contracts valued at up to $2,500 and do not require competition. This limit can be
raised to $15,000 during contingencies. The next category is simplified acquisitions,
which is capped at $100,000 normally and $250,000 during contingencies, and finally
commercial items which is normally capped at $5 million (Poole and Welch, 2005: 2).
The result of plotting the raw data of the number of contracts in each value band was
similar to the results obtained by plotting the number-of-contracts data. Analyzing the
bands in whole and by week resulted in findings similar to those based on the number-ofcontracts data. In particular, the category of contracts under $15, which accounted for
one-third of all the contracts, was remarkably similar. Due to this similarity of results
when using the contracts segregated into contract value bands and the aggregation of the
contracts, using value bands as a means of analysis was not pursued.
Testing for Chaos
Logistic Equation.
This study uses the logistic equation, in a manner similar to that of Priesmeyer
and Cole in their study. In this study X represents one day of logistics activity, measured
as a percent of either the value of contracts or the number of contracts. As with the
earlier study, the λ-parameter is the unknown to be calculated. The contracting data in
this study was used to look at both the first ten weeks of Katrina activity as 10-week
systems, and as one-week systems.
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The fit of a logistic regression line was first applied to the contract-values data
based on the 10-week system. This was analyzed by SBSS statistical software and the
result is below in figure 13. The curve appears as a typical, albeit nonlinear, regression
line.
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Figure 13. Logistic curve fit to 10-week system for contract-values data

The parameter SBSS estimated for the contract-values data was λ = 1.035, which if taken
as a measure of environmental stability suggests the system is stable. The F-value for the
fit is 29.7, which is significant at alpha less than 0.001; however, the R2-value is 0.304,
which means that approximately 70% of the variation cannot be explained by the
regression line. A similar analysis was made for the number-of-contracts data using the
10-week system. This fit is illustrated below in figure 14. It should be noted, the fit
appears closer than does the data in figure 13. This is due to the presence of outliers and
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a phenomenon known as the “King Kong” effect. The King Kong effect takes its name
from a theoretical study on the relationship of weight to height in a sample of gorillas in
which one extreme value, King Kong, is added. The addition of King Kong to the
sample of gorillas skews the height and weight data and effects their correlation. This
makes it appear that there is a greater relationship between weight and height of gorillas
than there was prior to adding King Kong (Makridakis, Wheelwright, and Hyndman,
1998: 197-198).

VAR00001
Observed
Logistic

0.15

Outliers

0.10

0.05

0.00
0

20

40

60

Sequence

Figure 14. Logistic curve fit to 10-week system for number-of-contracts data

SBSS estimated a parameter value for the number-of-contracts data of λ = 1.019, which if
interpreted as a measure of environmental stability also indicates a stable system. The Fvalue for the fit is 13.9, which is significant at alpha less than 0.001; the R2-value,
however, is 0.17 and indicates that the logistic regression line cannot explain 83% of the
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variation in the model. In both logistic regressions, there was a good fit to the data, but
the R2-values suggest there might be a better model to explain the variation. Also in both
cases, results indicate the systems are stable; nevertheless, it uses one parameter to
describe the stability of the entire ten weeks of relief operations.
As mentioned earlier, the problem with analyzing a ten-week system is that it
does not take into consideration changes in the system dynamics. Each time managers
make changes to it, the parameter will also likely change. So, another analysis was made
based on one-week systems. Each week was analyzed using Excel Solver to find the
parameters to best fit the empirical data using the logistic equation. The empirical data
was first put into an Excel spreadsheet along with the logistic equation. A nonlinear
algorithm was used in Excel Solver to identify the best X and λ that when applied to the
logistic equation would most closely match the empirical data. This was accomplished
by assigning X- and λ-values as changeable cells in Solver. The Sum Squared Error
(SSE) was used as the object to be minimized. Although a nonlinear algorithm was used,
several systematic runs needed to be made to ensure the result was not just a local
optimum. Below, table 2 provides the result of the fit test of the logistic equation to the
contract-values data. The r-value in the table is the correlation between the fitted logistic
equation and the empirical data for the week. The closer the correlation is to one, the
closer the fit is between the two models. Note that weeks one, six, and eight of the
contract-values data have high correlations and the associated parameter-λ is over 3.57,
or in other words, they are in the chaotic region.
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Table 2. Logistic equation fit results for contract-values data

Week
X

1

2

0.0008 0.500

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

0.865

0.081

0.202

0.028

0.336

0.003

0.111

0.007

λ

3.66

1.22

3.84

4

3.88

3.72

4

4

4

3.92

SSE

0.012

0.036

0.021

0.028

0.016

0.004

0.070

0.010

0.045

0.025

r

0.97

0.37

0.72

0.84

0.88

0.95

0.64

0.96

0.71

0.86

The same method was used to analyze the number-of-contracts data. The results are
illustrated below in table 3. The r-values in table 3 are not as high as in the previous
example table 2, and indicates the fit is not as close as with the contracts-value data.
Weeks one, four and six have the highest correlations and also have parameter-λ values
above 3.57.

Table 3. Logistic equation fit results for number-of-contract data

Week
X

1

2

0.0005 0.141

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

0.068

0.068

0.928

0.022

0.93

0.93

0.069

0.908

λ

4

1.8

4

4

3.93

3.58

4

4

4

2.68

SSE

0.053

0.016

0.003

0.006

0.026

0.006

0.008

0.022

0.014

0.035

r

0.95

0.50

0.89

0.90

0.71

0.91

0.85

0.74

0.77

0.55

58

It is interesting to note that in both tables, most weeks resulted in a fit that is in the
chaotic region, the region with a λ-parameter 3.57 or greater. It is also interesting to note
that both tables indicate that week two was in the one-attractor stability range. They had
λ-parameter values between 1 and 3, but they both also had the least close fit. Week ten
was inconsistent in its measurement of stability when comparing contract-values and
number-of-contracts data for the same week.
As a visual illustration of how close the fit is based on the correlation results, two
examples were embedded in two-dimensions and plotted so that the logistic data
generated can be visually compared to the empirical data. In the figures, plots based on
contract-values data are on top, plots based on number-of-contracts data are on the
bottom. They also have the data generated by the logistic equation on the left and the
empirical data on the right. The two-dimensional embedded plot for week one is
displayed below in figure 15. In this particular example, the correlation was relatively
high. There was a slightly closer fit between the contract-values data with its logistic
model, than with the number-of-contracts data with its logistic model. The correlation
between the contract-values data with its logistic model is 0.97, and the number-of
contracts has a 0.95 correlation. The similarity between the theoretical models and the
empirical data can clearly be seen in the figure. Another important characteristic of this
plot is the horseshoe pattern created by the data. This is characteristic of a system with a
purely deterministic chaos dynamic in the chaotic region with a λ-parameter value of 3.57
or higher.
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Horseshoe pattern

Figure 15. Plot of logistic generated data and empirical data for week one

However, not every week resulted in a close fit between the logistic equation and the
empirical data. The plots for week two illustrate a lower correlation between the
empirical and theoretical models. This lower correlation results in the inconsistency
found in the plots for week two exhibited below in figure 16. Visually the empirical data
does not resemble the chaos model for either the contract-values or numbers-of-contracts
data sets.
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Figure 16. Plot of logistic generated data and empirical data for week two

The other weeks also did not have a consistent fit with empirical data. Some weeks had a
better fit than others. The average fit for the contract-values data is a correlation of 0.79
and the average fit for numbers-of-contracts data is a 0.78 correlation. Plots of weeks
three through ten are exhibited in Appendix A.
Investigative Question answered by Logistic Equation.
Investigative question three asked, does this data reveal information about the
level of control exercised by federal agencies in awarding contracts during Katrina?
According to the results of the ten-week system, it was in control and stable. However
with a relatively low R2-value, using only one parameter to measure the first ten weeks
does not appear appropriate. The model could not explain most of the variation.

61

According to the one-week systems, most weeks were in or near the region of chaos. The
shorter timelines appeared to fit the logistic equation model to the empirical data better.
The high parameter values would indicate that the systems were not controlled. An
interesting result is that the two-dimensional embedded plots for week one, which had the
best fit, also resembled a purely deterministic chaos system in the chaotic region.
Embedding.
A three-dimensional model of the contracting data from Hurricane Katrina was
created using the embedding process. The time series was plotted using SBSS statistical
software, because it has the capability to graph in three dimensions. The result of using
the contract-values data based on a ten-week system is displayed below in figure 17. It
does not appear to form any distinctive patterns as would be expected if deterministic
chaos was present. Rather, it more closely resembles random data, as plotted in figure
10.
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Figure 17. Three-dimensional plot of embedded time series of contract-values data
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Likewise, the result of using the number-of-contracts data is displayed in figure 9. What
appears to be a pattern toward the middle of the plot is a concentration of the data due to
outliers (it is actually one outlier projected into three dimensions). If the outliers are
removed the plot also resembles random data, and is without pattern. Note that the
reason the scale appears small in figures 17 and 18 is that the data points being measured
are as a percent of all values for ten weeks. Therefore, each day is a small portion of the
total for the 70 days. The outliner is the spike of activity on 2 September 2005.
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Figure 18. Three-dimensional plot of embedded time series of number-of-contracts

Similar plots were made based on the one-week systems. The problem in
embedding one week of data is that with each dimension added in the embedding
process, a data point is lost. For instance, with seven days in a data set, a two
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dimensional plot results in six data points, and a three dimensional plot results in only
five data points. It becomes difficult to ascertain if there is a pattern or not with fewer
data points. Combining the one-week systems together does not make it one system;
therefore, putting them together does not result in a system recognizable as containing
deterministic chaos. For instance, figure 19 below illustrates the plotted data generated
by the logistic equation that best fit each week of empirical data combined into one threedimensional plot. It is not recognizably different from a plot of randomly generated data.
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Figure 19. Logistic equation generated data (used to fit contract-values data)

The same is true for the values generated by the logistic equation used to fit the numbersof-contract data, exhibited below in figure 20. What appears as a pattern in the center
disappears when the outliers are removed. Taking the outliers out also brings the plot
into the same scale as in figure 19. Note the limit of the plot in figure 19 is at 0.40 and
the limit in figure 20 is 0.80. Since the logistic equation generated data is known to
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exhibit deterministic chaos yet appears as random data in figures 18 and 19, the empirical
data would not be expected to be distinguishable from the random data either.
Individually, plots of the weeks in two dimensions would resemble the comparisons
made of weeks one and two in figures 15 and 16 above.
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Figure 20. Logistic equation generated data (used to fit number-of-contracts)

Investigative Question answered by Embedding.
Investigative question one is, does federal contracting data from Hurricane
Katrina exhibit characteristics that can be explained by chaos theory? After analyzing the
various plots of the ten-week systems and one-week systems, the empirical data from
Katrina does not appear to form a pattern as would be expected if deterministic chaos was
present. They appear to more closely resemble the plot of the random data. The
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exceptions are the two-dimensional plots for week one, which seem to indicate a strong
element of deterministic chaos.
Limit-cycle and Velocity Plot.
Priesmeyer and Baik used limit-cycle and velocity plots to uncover deterministic
chaos in business cycles (Priesmeyer and Bailk, 1989:47). Likewise, Priesmeyer and
Cole use a simpler process as a tool to manage disaster relief (Priesmeyer and Cole,
1996).
Before creating limit-cycle and velocity plots, two related variables are needed.
This study uses the related variables of the value of federal contracts and the number of
contracts becoming effective on each day. Since the limit-cycle and velocity plots are
meant to be management tools, rather than to identify if deterministic chaos is present,
the data was analyzed only using the one-week models. This also mimics the availability
of data as it might be available to managers, on a weekly basis. Managers would then
evaluate the cycle process at the end of the week to determine if they needed to make any
changes to the current process. In reality, during a disaster this would probably be done
on a daily basis; however, because of the limitations of the data, weekly information was
used.
The result of the business model limit-cycle for each of the ten weeks is displayed
below in figure 21. It can be seen in this figure that activity within each week was in all
four quadrants of the Cartesian plane. The first week shows a pattern of strong first and
third quadrant activity, the other weeks seem to oscillate along the x-axis. Since the
oscillation appears on the horizontal axis, this may indicate it is a one-attractor system
with random noise (Priesmeyer and Baik, 1989:18).
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Strong 1st
and 3rd
quadrant
movement

Figure 21. Business model limit-cycles for each of ten weeks

The cumulative limit-cycle, illustrated in figure 22, also shows the same pattern of
activity in the first and third quadrants as well as a pattern of activity along the x-axis. In
the examples presented by Priesmeyer and Baik, if a company was characterized by a
one- to four-period attractor in the beginning, the rotation of data activity along the x-axis
would be indicative of a movement toward chaos (Priesmeyer and Baik, 1989:21). That
does not appear to be what is happening with the oscillation in this case. As mentioned in
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the individual plots, after an initial shock to the first week, the plot appears to display a
one-attractor system with random noise, with more variation in the dollar value of the
contracts.
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Figure 22. Business model, 10 one-week systems cumulative limit-cycle

The velocity plot of the data used in the business model in figure 23 shows no apparent
pattern. It looks similar to the empirical data for one attractor companies in Priesmeyer
and Baik’s study. The ideal velocity plot for a one attractor company is a horizontal line,
so the pattern is caused entirely by noise or random error (Priesmeyer and Baik,
1989:19).
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Figure 23. Business model velocity plot

This study uses contract value and the number of contracts measured as a percent
of weekly totals as the variables in the disaster model limit-cycle. The information
gathered from the disaster model limit-cycle has a different interpretation from the
business model. Rather than looking for patterns to predict future business cycle activity,
the plotted data are to make a diagnosis as far as whether more or less resources are
needed, possibly indicating a change in the disaster response development. In the case of
this study, data in the quadrants indicate the following:
Quadrant 1: Increase in both contract value and number
Quadrant 2: Increase in contract number but decreasing contract value
Quadrant 3: Decrease in both contract value and number
Quadrant 4: Increase in contract value but fewer contracts
The shape of the data in the weekly plots of the disaster model limit-cycle is not different
than in the business model, it merely shifts its position on the Cartesian plane based on
the mean change. In this case, the mean change is less than 0.003, so the shift is not
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visually perceivable. However, since the location of the plot in relation to the x- and yaxis is important, the disaster model plot is available and exhibited in Appendix B. The
plots in figure 21 and 22 above indicate that after the initial spike in the change in both
the number of contracts and their value in week one, the number of contracts does not
vary more than 20 percent. The change in value of the contracts varies by up to 40
percent, but most weeks the change is approximately 30 percent. It appears the plots
might provide managers information concerning potential limits and cycle. This is
especially true in the number-of-contracts data. The difficulty is in knowing whether the
number of contracts suggests a limit to the number of people needed to award contracts,
or does the number of people available to award contracts contribute to the limit
exhibited in the plot? This difference would probably be resolved by a manager familiar
with the system being observed.
Investigative Question answered by Limit-cycle and Velocity Plot.
Investigative question two explores whether the data reveal an underlying pattern
that could be useful to management for decision making? Analyzing the data with the
business limit-cycle reveals that the first week had strong activity in the first and third
Cartesian plane quadrants. Depending on the other data this could be a spike associated
with chaos, or an oscillation between two points. Based on the data in this study, the
spike indicates movement into chaos. Weeks two through ten exhibited a limit on the
resources not varying beyond 40 percent in contract-values and 20 percent in number-ofcontracts data. If these limits are not the result of a workforce constraint, this information
might be useful to management. It may indicate that from day to day the expected
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change of contract values would not exceed 40 percent and therefore allow a prediction
of worst case expected costs over a given timeframe.
Results and analysis conclusion
The Katrina contracting data was analyzed several ways. Initially, the raw data
was plotted and spikes in data were linked to Katrina events, to see if they might offer an
explanation. Then the empirical data was compared to the theoretical models.
The first model was the logistic equation. The data was analyzed using both tenweek systems and one-week systems. The ten-week systems indicated Katrina relief was
stable, with one attractor, but the model could only explain approximately 30 percent of
the variation at best. Closer fits were made using the one-week models ranging from a
high correlation of 0.97 to a low of 0.37. The average correlation was 0.78 for the
number-of-contracts data and 0.79 for the contracts-value. This suggests a strong
relationship, but not necessarily the same line. The difference may be due to the addition
of an element of randomness.
The next model was embedding the data. The data was embedded into three
dimensions and visually inspected for evidence of deterministic chaos. This comparison
found the ten-week systems undistinguishable from a similar system generated by
random numbers. Likewise, combining the one-week systems into one database found
them indistinguishable from a randomly generated one; this despite the fact the data was
known to contain deterministic chaos. Consequently, if the known chaos model is not
recognizable from random data; the empirical data likely will not be either. Therefore,
the one-week empirical systems were not combined and embedded into three dimensions.
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The final analysis of one-week systems uses two limit-cycle models, a business
model and a disaster model. The result of the business model, suggested the evolving
system had one attractor with random error or noise. The disaster model also identified
potential system limits.
Taken together, except for the first week, the results of the tests for deterministic chaos
are inconclusive. Analyzing the data as a ten-week system reveals the chaos model is not
a good means of explaining the empirical dynamics. Utilizing one-week systems finds
the chaos model more closely fitting the empirical data with the λ-parameter lying
primarily in the chaotic region. Embedding the data in three dimensions found the tenweek system indistinguishable from chaos; however, embedding week one in two
dimensions identified a good fit between the logistics model and empirical data.
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V. Discussion and Recommendations
Relevance
The purpose of this research was to find out if an area of complexity science
called chaos theory could be used to extract useful information from the Katrina
contracting data that would help managers make better logistics decisions during disaster
relief. This is relevant because if deterministic chaos is present in disaster relief
operations, it would mean that events initially thought to evolve from random processes
may actually be deterministic. Furthermore, initial conditions during disaster relief will
have a significant affect on the disaster outcome and some of these outcomes will be
unexpected. More importantly, it also means that some events during disaster relief that
appear to develop from uncontrollable earlier events may actually be controllable.
This study also looked at two analytical techniques used by Priesmeyer and Cole
to help disaster managers in decision making and to more effectively control disaster
relief operations. For instance, it tested whether finding a logistic equation that closely
fits the empirical data might provide feedback that would allow managers to determine
the level of stability in the support provided for disaster relief. Also, the logistic equation
might indicate if additional guidance/requirements on responders would be helpful or if it
would nudge the support system into an area where control is lost. Another technique
analyzed was the disaster limit-cycle model. The limit-cycle was used to see whether it
could provide insight into what to expect in terms of the limit on resources and reveal
cycles within the relief dynamics.
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Reflections on the data
The result of looking at Katrina logistics support as ten-week systems did not
reveal any evidence of deterministic chaos. Fitting a logistics regression line to the data,
provided a significant fit, but could only explain 30 percent of the variation at best.
Likewise, embedding the ten-week systems in three dimensions resulted in a plot that was
indistinguishable from a plot created by embedding random data.
Analyzing the data in one-week systems resulted in more promising findings.
Although, the fit of the empirical data to data generated by the logistic equation varied
from week to week; the first week resulted in a close fit. Week one had a 0.97 correlation
based on contract-values data, and a 0.95 correlation based on the number of contracts.
Furthermore, the pattern created by embedding both systems into two dimensions
resulted in distinct curves, somewhat like a horseshoe. This is characteristic of a purely
deterministic chaos system with a stability level in the chaotic region. For instance, a
two-dimensional plot of the same known chaos data exhibited in figure 9 creates a
horseshoe shape. This is illustrated below in figure 24. This horseshoe pattern is evident
in the empirical data from week one displayed earlier in figure 15.
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Figure 24. Two-dimensional plot of embedded time series, X = 0.5, λ = 3.99

Only data from the one-week systems were applied to the limit-cycle models.
The models do not test whether deterministic chaos is present, but are models in which
data containing deterministic chaos can be applied to reveal information concerning its
dynamics. This study found that except for the first week, the business model limit-cycle
plots exhibited what appears to be a single-point attractor with random noise. The
velocity plot findings support this conclusion. This indicates that the business cycle is
stable and that the variation is caused by random noise rather than by deterministic chaos.
The first week displayed a spike well outside the “normal” cycle, which would indicate a
system in the chaos region (with a λ-parameter value over 3.57). Furthermore, it
indicates that the dynamic is an unstable business cycle and that the variation can be
explained by chaos theory. Both the business model and disaster models exhibited a limit
both in the amount of change in the number of contracts and in the value of the contracts.
The disaster model does not appear to offer any useful information on the development of
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the response based on the Cartesian quadrant in which activity takes place, but perhaps
offers information on system limitations.
Research conclusion
This research found what appears to be an element of deterministic chaos during
the first week of logistics support during Hurricane Katrina. This is based on the results
of two tests. First, it was possible to find a logistic equation model that fit the empirical
data at 0.95 or greater. Second, because when the empirical data from the first week is
embedded in two-dimensions, it displays a pattern characteristic of a deterministic chaos
system. Furthermore, although not a test of chaos, the limit-cycle model results of the
first week support the level of chaos identified by the two tests. The tests for
deterministic chaos in subsequent weeks, however, were inconclusive. Also, because the
level of stability during the first week was in the chaotic region and deterministic chaos
in subsequent weeks could not be substantiated, the analysis could not test the value of
the logistics model as an indicator of bifurcations that might offer managers feedback on
the effects of their decisions
The findings of this research conclude that initial conditions of disaster response
will have a significant affect on the relief outcome and furthermore, some of the events
during disaster relief that appear to evolve from uncontrollable events may be
controllable. It is therefore likely that managers can control the evolution of disaster
response by the decisions they make prior to and during the disaster. Unfortunately, this
study was not able to substantiate the effectiveness of management tools such as
matching the logistic equation to empirical data to identify bifurcation points in the
system or using the disaster model limit-cycle to guide management decisions/policies.
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Recommendation for further research
Further research into the application of chaos theory to disaster response should
provide further understanding of this phenomenon and perhaps lead to more efficient
disaster response. One area for further research is changing the measurements used in
this study. For instance, the data in this study was limited to logistics activity measured
by day and the most responsive systems consisting of seven days. Having data
measuring logistics activity by hour could allow a more robust analysis of what is
happening during the first week of logistics support. It may even be possible to look at
how stable the system is on a daily basis. Likewise, logistics activity may be measured
using something besides contracts, such as by disaster commodities like water or meals
served. This study was concerned with federal logistics support; however, other logistics
support systems could be evaluated. For instance, did state or private relief agencies
behave similarly as federal activity?
Another area of research is in conducting a similar case study, but in parallel with
other cases. This study looked at one disaster, Hurricane Katrina. Priesmeyer and Cole
looked at several disasters with the data combined into one data set. Another possibility
is to compare two or three disasters with each other and with the theoretical model. Does
logistics support in similar disasters develop similarly? For instance, do all hurricanes
have the same level of stability in the first week?
A final area of further research is looking at another branch of chaos theory
concerned with the spatial evolution of a system. For instance, how did the logistic
support evolve geographically? Did relief begin in several areas in isolation and then
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combine as the relief capability grew? Did it evolve in the way that fractional chaos
would expect?
Summary
This study provided some answers to the research questions, but could not fully
address the issue of using chaos theory to improve management practices during disaster
relief. This is due to inconclusive results in this study on the usefulness of the
management tools presented. Also, the scale used to measure the dynamics of the system
created another limitation. It was not small enough to capture the detail necessary to
catch changes in the level of stability. Nevertheless, the research does support the
argument that there is an element of deterministic chaos in some logistics activities
during disaster relief.
Finding deterministic chaos during the first week of Katrina suggests a
justification for using chaos theory at least metaphorically to understand logistics support
during catastrophic disaster relief. Consequently, the research findings support the
conclusion that initial conditions of disaster response will have a significant affect on the
relief outcome. Furthermore, some of the events during disaster relief that appear to
evolve from uncontrollable events may be controllable. Therefore, managers are likely
able to control the evolution of disaster response by the decisions they make prior to and
during the disaster. This is especially true during the initial relief effort. In her research,
Murphy uses the examples of the Exxon Valdez oil spill and the Johnson & Johnson
Tylenol tampering event as contrasting cases of how disaster response can evolve. In the
case of Exxon, slow reaction to remedy the problem enabled a negative public perception
to evolve whereas in the case of Johnson & Johnson, quick action led to a positive public
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perception (Murphy, 1996). One can only speculate how differently the relief during
Katrina could have evolved if managers had taken advantage of preparation prior to
landfall and made quick, decisive actions early in the disaster response. Looking at the
problems relating to communication, supply chain management and organizational
behavior, it is clear that better preparation and clear, decisive action early in the disaster
would have alleviated some of the problems. The chaos of Katrina need not have been so
uncontrolled.
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Appendix A
Plots for weeks three through ten are embedded in two-dimensions. In the figures, plots
based on contract-values data are on top, plots based on number-of-contracts data are on
the bottom. They also have the data generated by the logistic equation on the left and the
empirical data on the right.
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Appendix B

Disaster model limit-cycles for each of ten weeks
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